This study examines the effects of democratization on the size and composition of government expenditure using the data of 125 countries between 1972 and 2010 at most. Specifically, we focus not only on the total expenditure but also on their composition and employ dichotomous indices of political regimes rather than score indices. Moreover, we construct instruments for democratization based on the democratization wave and conduct an instrumental variables estimation to address endogeneity problems. Our results show that while democratization does not have a significant impact on total expenditure, it increases expenditure on health and education and decreases expenditure on defense. Furthermore, considering the time-varying effect of democratization, defense expenditure starts decreasing immediately after a regime change and health expenditure increases in the medium and long run, while they do not significantly vary before a regime change. Thus, while focusing only on total expenditure does not uncover the effects of democratization, considering detailed categories of government expenditure enables us to understand how democratization changes governments' behaviors.
Introduction
The "Third Wave of Democratization" (Huntington, 1991) has given birth to a number of newly democratic countries. In addition, recent years have witnessed various democratization movements around the world (e.g., the Arab spring in 2010 and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2014).
Democratization or political regime change can largely affect subsequent public policies because it involves various institutional changes including the political process. In order to uncover the effect of democratization on public policies, this study empirically investigates changes in the size and composition of government expenditure before and after democratization, using a dataset of 125 countries from 1972 to 2010 at most.
While many previous studies examine the effect of political regimes on public policies, their results are not simply comparable because they cover different periods and countries and use different estimation methodologies. Moreover, some earlier works focus on specific expenditure or policy outcomes, or use the political regime index as one of the additional control variables. Our study differs from them in the following aspects. First, we employ the data on central government expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and specifically consider total expenditure and six subcategories of expenditure, namely expenditure on health, education, social protection, defense, economic affairs, and general public services. Therefore, we examine the comprehensive and detailed effects of democratization on public policies. In addition, by focusing on expenditure rather than policy outcomes, we can capture the change in a government's behavior after excluding the effects of the efficiency of its regime and other political factors. 1 Second, we use dichotomous indices of political regimes and estimate a difference-in-differences model, considering that democratized countries are the treated group and non-reforming countries are the control group. Most of the previous empirical studies in economics focusing on the effects of political regimes employ a score index of democracy such as the Freedom House measures and the Polity score. However, using a score index may not be suitable for investigating the effects of regime transition, because it cannot distinguish the effects of a regime change from those of the performance of each regime. Gradstein and Milanovic (2004, p. 516 ) point out that "quality of governance or political instability are conceptually different from democracy: they address political performance of a system, not its inherent (democratic or not) features." Furthermore, they give an example of countries that have the same polity scores but show differences in terms of political stability. 2 Therefore, we mainly analyze the effect of permanent democratization, which is defined as a transition to a democracy without reverse transitions in the sample period. 3 This is because the consolidation of the institutions should be considered in order to investigate the effect of regime 1 Nelson (2007) points out that democracy increases education and health spending but does not necessarily improve their outcomes, and that institutional reform in a democracy plays an important role in securing better results. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that democratization can be constrained by various factors such as the elite's investment in his/her political power, population heterogeneity, and power transfer to the middle class rather than to the poor. They find empirical evidence that democratization increases total tax revenues as a share of GDP but has a limited impact on decline in inequality. 2 The definition and the classification of "political regime" have been controversial topics in political science. See, for example, Diamond (2002) and Svolik (2012, Chapter 2) . 3 In this paper, permanent democratization and successful democratization can be used interchangeably.
transitions. In other words, we focus on the effects of the event of democratization given the good performance/consolidation of the associated institutions.
Third, we carefully address endogeneity problems. In reality, democratization is not a random event, and thus, it can be correlated with various economic conditions. Moreover, any dichotomous regime index can be subject to misclassification, and concerns about omitted variables are common to most empirical works. In addition, focusing only on permanent democratization can aggravate endogeneity concerns because a regime index includes information on the future state of institutions, as pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2014) . To deal with these problems, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) method. Inspired by Aidt and Jensen (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) , we use the number of democratizations in neighboring countries as an instrument for democratization.
Finally, we investigate the time-varying effects of democratization. Since political regime transitions have a large and broad impact on the whole society, democratization shows both lead and lag effects, which reflect individuals' expectations and the consolidation of institutions. Then, these timevariant effects can lead to a non-monotonic relationship between democratization and government expenditure. 4 In addition, our estimation procedure can suffer from misspecification, as pointed by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) . Therefore, following Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), we divide the periods before and after the regime change into five subperiods (pre-transition, transition, short-run democratization, medium-run democratization, and long-run democratization) and examine the effects of democratization in each period. Considering flexible time-varying treatment effects also alleviates the causal problem between democratization and public expenditure.
Our main findings are as follows. Democratization does not have a significant impact on total expenditure. Considering each category of government expenditure, among redistributive policies, democratization significantly increases expenditure on health and education, whereas it does not affect expenditure on social protection. Instead, expenditure on defense significantly decreases after democratization. Furthermore, considering the timing of democratization, defense expenditure starts decreasing immediately after the regime change, and health expenditure increases in the medium and long run. Thus, we find that an increase in health expenditure due to democratization takes place relatively slowly. In addition, we show that the expenditure on general public services decreases in all subperiods.
There is a vast literature on the relationship between public expenditure and political regimes. Expenditure on defense can be affected by several factors that are irrelevant to social sector spending, because military power is an important source of political power inside and outside the country. For example, particularly in a dictatorship, while military power gives authorities the ability to repress the masses and neighboring countries, excessive reliance on it empowers the military, which is a potential political rival of the authorities (Svolik, 2012) . Political importance of military power is generally considered to be larger in a dictatorship than in a democracy, because a dictatorship does not have formal mechanisms of power transition, and violence is the ultimate measures to obtain power. 5 Therefore, military spending tends to be higher in a dictatorship.
Empirically, previous studies such as Dunne This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain our estimation methodology. Section 3 describes the data and explains the construction of the expenditure variables. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation and robustness checks, and discusses them. Section 5 concludes.
Estimation methodology
To examine the effects of democratization on the size and composition of government expenditure, we use the annual data of 125 countries over the period 1972-2010. We estimate an equation specified 6 Empirical evidence for the democratic wave is provided by, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2009).
as
where subscripts i and t represent a country and year, respectively. η is a year-specific effect, u is a country-specific effect, and ϵ is an error term. Government expenditure refers to total government expenditure and various categories of government expenditure as shares of GDP. These variables are in the natural logarithm. D is democratization, which is a dichotomous variable, and more specifically, is defined as one in the subsequent years after a country is democratized and zero otherwise. It is noted that this variable is zero if a country has always had a democratic or autocratic regime. We explain the definitions and sources of government expenditure and democratization in more detail in the next section. X encompasses a constant, a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, and other control variables, such as real GDP per capita, total population, fraction of population between the ages 0 to 14 as a share of the total population, fraction of population aged 65 and above as a share of the total population, trade openness defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, income inequality, and inflation. All these control variables, except for inflation and a dummy for the accounting system, are in the natural logarithm. GDP per capita represents the level of economic development in a country. As the literature on Wagner's law (e.g., Therefore, following Seiferling (2013) , to control for differences in accounting systems, we include a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, which is equal to one if the data of the accrual basis accounting are used and zero otherwise.
We conduct the fixed effects estimation, which enables us to control for country-fixed effects such ethnolinguistic, geographical, and cultural factors. For example, ethnic diversity and climate conditions, which are almost time-invariant in the sample period, can affect the size and composition of government expenditure. Shelton (2007) , who examines the determinants of the composition of government expenditure, intends to consider measurement errors of government expenditure and then uses the random effects estimation. Because the random effects estimation does not control for country-specific effects, he adds various time-invariant explanatory variables such as electoral systems and ethnic fractionalization. On the other hand, we consider that addressing country-specific effects is more important in a country-level panel data analysis, and thus, we employ a fixed effects estimation.
Our estimation model is a difference-in-differences model like the one used by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). The treated group is democratization countries and the control group is non-reforming countries, which include countries that have always been democratic and those that have always been autocratic. The difference-in-differences model of democratization has several concerns; in particular, the democratization variable should be strictly exogenous for the estimator to be unbiased. If democratization is likely to occur when the size and composition of government expenditure show some trends, the coefficient of the democratization variable reflects those trends and can be biased upwards or downwards. Therefore, we conduct an IV estimation to tackle endogeneity problems. In addition, we also examine time-varying effects of democratization on the government budget to deal with the concerns pointed out by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) .
Finally, to address the downward bias of the difference-in-differences estimators, we employ adjusted standard errors allowing for country-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Bertrand et al. (2004) .
Data
The data used in this study are drawn from various databases and several previous papers. Depending upon the availability of datasets, we collected the annual data of 125 countries over the period 1972-2010. The countries in our sample are listed in Table A1 Because GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 have different methodologies, these two databases are not easily merged together. 7 Therefore, we follow Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) to merge these two databases in order to obtain a longer panel dataset of government expenditure.
We face four main concerns while merging the two databases. First, the classifications of the Historical GFS and GFS are different; more specifically, the former has 14 categories, and the (5) environmental protection, (6) housing and community amenities, (7) health, (8) recreation, culture, and religion, (9) education, and (10) social protection. Among them, we focus on total expenditure and the following six subcategories, which are likely to be related to democratization: expenditure on health, education, social protection, defense, economic affairs, and general public services. Second, 7 Wickens (2002) describes the differences between these two databases in more detail.
GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 have different accounting bases. The former reports a cash basis, whereas the latter mainly reports an accrual basis. Regarding this concern, Seiferling (2013, p.
9) states, "Although there does not exist a technically sophisticated method for converting cash data to accrual (or vice versa), for practical purposes, it is acceptable to merge these data for most series and include a dummy variable in parametric analysis to control for any systematic differences that may exist." Following his argument, we include a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting.
In addition, for countries that report both accounting bases within a given year in the GFS, we use the data based on the accrual basis. Third, while the Historical GFS provides the data of consolidated central governments only, the GFS additionally provides the data of the consolidated general governments. To ensure consistency in this study, we use the data of the consolidated central governments for both databases. We list countries and their democratization years in Table A1 of the Appendix.
The data of other control variables such as GDP per capita, total population, fraction of population between ages 0 to 14 as a share of the total population, fraction of population aged 65
and above as a share of the total population, trade openness, and inflation are obtained from the expenditure as a share of GDP is not significant. Next, we examine whether the government conducts specific redistributive policies after democratization. In columns (2)- (4), we consider the health, education, and social protection expenditure divided by GDP. Among them, only health expenditure significantly increases after democratization, in line with the predictions of the models a la Meltzer and Richard (1981) . Column (5) (6) and (7) show that democratization negatively impacts expenditure on economic affairs and general public services, but these effects are not significant.
Empirical results

Basic results
[ Table 1 here]
In Table 2 , we control for inequality and inflation. Despite controlling for these variables, we obtain the same results as in Table 1 , that is, democratization significantly increases health expenditure and decreases defense expenditure. 11
[ Table 2 here] 9 We employ the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Version 4.0) developed by Solt (2009). 10 The expenditure on defense can be affected by wars. We also control for a dummy variable for war, which equals one if there are at least 1000 battle-related deaths and zero otherwise. This variable is constructed using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v. 4-2014a, 1946-2013 , which is provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) . The results remain unchanged even if we include this dummy variable. 11 We conduct the same regression analyses, using government expenditure as a share of total government expenditure instead of as a share of GDP. As explained in section 3, we merge the data measured by the cash and accrual bases of accounting. If we use government expenditure as a share of total government expenditure, the differences between the accounting bases seem to be less of a problem. In this analysis, as in Table 1 , democratization significantly increases health expenditure and decreases defense expenditure. In addition, educational expenditure significantly increases after democratization.
Alternative democratization indices
In this section, we use two different indices of democratization in order to confirm the robustness of the results. We construct the data pertaining to successful democratization based on Acemoglu As in Tables 1 and 2 , democratization has a significantly positive impact on health expenditure and a significantly negative effect on defense expenditure. In addition, in column (6), democratization significantly decreases expenditure on economic affairs.
[ Table 3 here] Second, Table 4 [ Table 4 here]
Instrumental variables estimation
In this section, we conduct a panel IV estimation to address endogeneity problems. Motivated by 
where δ ij is the time-invariant great-circle distance between the capitals of countries i and j, δ is half the length of the equator, and N t is the number of countries in the world. S it is zero if a country is autocratic and one if it is democratic. D jt is a democratization variable as in Eq. (1) and its construction is based on 39 full democratization episodes as in Papaioannou and Siourounis' Our identification strategy is that democratization is affected by (exogenous) democratization in other countries. Since democratization occurs only in dictatorial countries, the instrument takes zero when a country is a democratic, and the instrument is affected by democratization in other countries all over the world. In the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) , many countries in Latin America were democratized in the 1980s, and many countries in Eastern Europe and Africa were democratized in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, democratization in other countries is unlikely to influence government behavior directly. Therefore, our constructed IV for democratization are valid in that the instruments are highly correlated with democratization in a given country and do not directly influence the dependent variable. Because the democratization wave seems to affect political regimes after a certain period of time, we use the first, second, and third lags of Z as the instruments for democratization. Table 5 shows the panel IV estimation results. We first confirm the validity of the instruments from the statistical viewpoint. In all columns, the F -values for the tests of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions exceed 10, satisfying the "rule of thumb" proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) . Moreover, the Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions at the conventional significance level in all columns.
[ Table 5 here]
The results in Table 5 are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2 ; democratization significantly increases health expenditure and decreases defense expenditure. A notable difference is that democratization also has a significant positive impact on educational expenditure, as seen in column (3).
Time-varying effects
The effects of democratization on the composition of government expenditure may not be monotonic. Specifically, we estimate the following equation.
Consider that a country is democratized when t = T . variables are equal to zero in the years that are not specified. Table 6 shows the estimation results. As shown below in detail, we do not find a non-monotonic relationship between democratization and expenditure. In column (1), democratization does not have a significant impact on total government expenditure in all periods around the transition. In column (2), the expenditure on health increases in the medium and long run, and its impact is larger in the long run. In columns (3) and (4), the expenditure on education and social protection do not change for any timing of democratization. In column (5), the expenditure on defense decreases immediately after democratization, and its impacts are larger in the medium and long run. Democratization does not have a significant impact on the expenditure on economic affairs, as seen in column (6) . In column (7), the expenditure on general public services decreases through all periods.
This result differs from those in Tables 1 and 2 , and classifying the timings of democratization can capture the different effects on the expenditure on general public services.
[ Table 6 here]
Different types of transitions
In this section, we examine the different effects depending on the types of democratization. We In all columns, the coefficients and significances of full democratization are almost the same as in Tables 1 and 2 . In contrast, partial democratization has a positive effect only on the expenditure 14 Since the end of the Cold War, most of the countries practicing dictatorship have nominally adopted democratic political institutions (Diamond, 2002) and thus, have become partially democratized. All the countries classified as partially democratized by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) were democratized in the 1990s, except for Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey.
on general public services (see column (8) ). These results suggest that the effect of partial democratization on government expenditure is quite different from that of full democratization. Borderline democratization has a negative impact on expenditure on health, education, and general public services (see columns (2) , (3), and (7), respectively), whereas it has a positive impact on expenditure on social protection, as seen in column (4) . Moreover, the reverse transition from a democracy to a dictatorship increases total expenditure (see column (1)) and expenditure on social protection (see column (4)). If the reverse transition gives rise to effects opposite to those of democratization, the sign of coefficient of the reversals dummy should be opposite to that of (full) democratization.
Thus, our results seem to be inconsistent. Because our sample includes only two countries that have undergone reversal, Gambia and Zimbabwe, it is difficult to judge whether the results reflect the political events in these two countries over a period or if they are generalized (i.e., apply to all reversals). 15 The same caveat also applies to the results for borderline democratization because only six countries are classified as such in our sample.
[ Table 7 here]
Discussion
In this section, we summarize the results obtained so far and discuss them. Our estimation results
show that democratization has no significant impact on total government expenditure as a share of GDP. On the other hand, considering specific categories of government expenditure, we find that the expenditure on health and education significantly increases after democratization. These results When considering the time-varying effects of democratization, both changes in expenditure on health and defense are observed only after regime transition. In particular, the increase in health expenditure becomes gradually larger in the medium and long run. This suggests that dictatorships may not significantly change their policies regarding health and military spending even if they expect democratization, and that redistributive policies are implemented as democracy is consolidated.
Furthermore, we also find that democratization significantly decreases the expenditure on general public services before and after regime transition. The interpretation of this result is somewhat difficult, but this may reflect the chaos in general governmental functions in the midst of a regime transition, given that the expenditure on general public services includes expenses for financial and fiscal affairs and diplomacy. 16 15 An increase in total expenditure in countries classified under the category "reversals" may especially reflect the events in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe witnessed a reversal in 1987. Its total government expenditure as a share of GDP was 29.70% in 1986 and increased to 40.34% in 1996. 16 As a further check, we estimate Eq. (3) after replacing dummy D 5 with two new dummies, D 6 and D 7 , which are respectively defined as one if t = T + 7, T + 8, T + 9 and if t ≥ T + 10. Then, the coefficient of
, and D 6 have significant negative impacts. This result suggests that the effect of democratization Furthermore, focusing on various types of democratization, partial democratization affects the government expenditure differently from full (permanent) democratization. Specifically, partial democratization increases the expenditure on general public services only. This finding suggests that partially democratized countries, most of which are former socialist and African countries democratized in the 1990s, may hardly change their policies even after democratization. 17 Overall, focusing only on total expenditure does not allow us to uncover the change in governments' behaviors after democratization. However, considering detailed categories of government expenditure enables us to understand how democratization affects governments' behaviors. That is, while democratization increases some social sector spending, it simultaneously decreases the expenditure on defense. As a result, the size of government expenditure does not seem to be influenced by democratization.
Concluding remarks
More countries have become democratic in recent times. Thus, it has become more important to investigate how political regime changes influence subsequent public policies. Using the data of 125 countries between 1972 and 2010 at most, this study examines how democratization affects the size and composition of government expenditure. To reveal the detailed changes pertaining to democratization in governments' behaviors, we focus on six subcategories of expenditure, namely health, education, social protection, defense, economic affairs, and general public services, and total expenditure. In addition, we construct the IV for democratization based on historical events of the democratization wave to deal with the endogeneity of democratization. Our results show that while democratization does not have a significant impact on total expenditure, it has significant impacts on certain subcategories of expenditure. Among redistributive policies, democratization significantly increases expenditure on health and education, although it does not affect expenditure on social protection. Instead, expenditure on defense significantly decreases after democratization.
Furthermore, considering the timing of democratization, defense expenditure starts decreasing immediately after a regime change and health expenditure increases in the medium and long run, while these types of expenditure do not significantly change before a regime change. We also show that the expenditure on general public services decreases in all subperiods.
This study uses dichotomous measures and focuses on successful democratization. While our approach can capture the effect of a regime change given the quality of institutions, the scope of a political regime and its transition is not broad. Although we investigate the effects of various types of democratization in section 4.5, the analyses on incomplete democratization and reverse transition may not be sufficient because countries that are not fully democratized and non-democracies can take various forms. In particular, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many dictatorial countries are likely to mimic democracies, and this tendency is fostered by increasing international intervention in on the expenditure on general public services is transitory rather than permanent. This may also explain why the negative effect on the expenditure on general public services is insignificant in the other analyses.
non-democracies (Diamond, 2002) . In order to examine the recent global wave of democratization,
we should obtain a more rich understanding of regime types and transition mechanisms. These are important and interesting topics for future research, both in the empirical and theoretical sense.
Appendix
See Tables A1-A3. [ Table A1 here]
[ Table A2 here]
[ Table A3 here] Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization and inflation are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. The instruments for democratization are the first, second, and third lags of the constructed instruments, Z. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. (1999, 2005, 2013 
